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ARTICLES
BABY M: CATALYST FOR FAMILY
LAW REFORM?
Walter J. Wadlington *
One can be justifiably skeptical about whether anything new and meaning-
ful remains to be said about In re Baby M.' Certainly it was one of the most
publicized and critically dissected family law cases of all time. During its
highly chronicled progression through the New Jersey legal system an ex-
traordinary number of people debated the rights of the parties and various
moral and social issues that may or may not have been involved. Many
expressed strong views as to what future steps might be appropriate for
courts and legislatures to take to avert or resolve similar disputes. The pur-
pose of this Comment is not to reexamine in detail the touching facts of the
Baby M case or to rekindle arguments about the ethicality or feasibility of
surrogate parent contracts generally. Its narrow focus is on how the unani-
mous decision of the New Jersey Supreme Court2 might have a catalytic
effect in igniting broad reform of the law of parent and child, a segment of
domestic relations law still relatively untouched by explosive change in other
areas such as grounds for divorce, private ordering between spouses, and
matrimonial property.
To explain the importance of such reform and why it is placed in special
perspective by the Baby M decision, an overview of significant social, scien-
tific and legal developments during the past quarter century will be offered at
the outset of this Comment. Their importance for the law of parent and
child will be explained in the context of increasing use of assisted concep-
* James Madison Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. Portions of
this Article derive from a Brendan F. Brown Lecture delivered by the author at The Catholic
University of America, The Columbus School of Law, Washington, D.C. 20064 in Spring,
1988.
1. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1127 (1988). No attempt is made here to catalogue all of the
various hearings and motions that were reported in the press. Our concern will be with the
trial court opinion, reported at 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1127 (1987) and the decision of
the Supreme Court of New Jersey, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227.
2. 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227.
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tion3 techniques during the past quarter of a century.
Twenty-five years ago, domestic relations could best be characterized as a
static field in which some of the most prominent rules anachronistically re-
flected conduct, mores and language of the preceding century or earlier. Re-
form movements in other legal fields4 had little contemporaneous impact on
domestic relations. Attempts at serious conceptualization of the area still
were sparse and began appearing only gradually, in large measure as part of
the serious exploration that led to reform of the grounds for divorce to
deemphasize deeply entrenched notions of moral blameworthiness. Increas-
ing availability and use of assisted conception techniques provide a good
background for examining the general reluctance to face problems that since
have proliferated in the law of parent and child. By now the issues include
rights and duties of support, custody and visitation, inheritance, paternity
and maternity, legitimate and illegitimate status (where such distinctions re-
main), adoption and termination of parental rights, and legal decision mak-
ing by or on behalf of children on matters such as education and medical
care. It would be incorrect, of course, to suggest that the rules on such
matters have remained the same during all of this period. However, changes
that did occur too often were made haphazardly or without adequate consid-
eration or recognition of their broader implications. Fresh attempts at con-
ceptualization are specially needed now in the face of a concatenation of
developments and events that have begun to produce new problems and ex-
acerbate old ones.
I. THE SPECIAL CASE OF "ASSISTED CONCEPTION"
For a long time legislatures avoided more than token attention to legal
problems that were being generated through use of even simple assisted con-
ception techniques.5 This can be attributed to various reasons that include
prevailing perceptions that such practices were de minimis in incidence or
3. "Assisted conception" is one of several newer terms that embrace a variety of tech-
niques ranging from artificial insemination to in vitro fertilization. It received a boost toward
standardization recently when it was selected as the new generic category for the UNIFORM
STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT. See UNIFORM ACT ON STATUS OF
CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION § 1(1) & commentary, 9B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989) (Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 1988) [hereinafter USCACA].
4. One example would be the turn of the century movement away from fault as the key
criterion for liability through new approaches such as workers compensation.
5. For further discussion, see Wadlington, Artificial Conception: The Challenge for Fam-
ily Law, 69 VA. L. REV. 465 (1983) [hereinafter Wadlington, Artificial Conception];
Wadlington, Artificial Insemination: The Dangers of a Poorly Kept Secret, 64 Nw. U.L. REV.
777, 793 (1970) [hereinafter Wadlington, Artificial Insemination]; Smith, Artificial Insemina-
tion-No Longer a Quagmire, 3 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1969).
[Vol. 5:1
Baby M: Catalyst For Family Law Reform?
too delicate or controversial for public discussion, or that the issues were
insoluble without major legal change that seemed premature.
The incidence of assisted conception and the number of persons poten-
tially affected by it today surely preclude de minimis categorization any
longer.6 And it would be ridiculous to consider the subject too sensitive for
public discussion when it already has been subjected to massive media cover-
age including talk shows featuring the players in various reproductive scena-
rios. Although considerable controversy unquestionably remains, this is
counterbalanced by heightened recognition of the need for legal clarity. It is
true that many of the key issues are unanswerable without major change that
could have impact far beyond cases of assisted conception, but facing those
larger concerns is no longer premature in view of other developments in
domestic relations. It is in that context that the Baby M decision could have
great influence.
II. BABY M: THE RELEVANT FACETS OF THE DECISIONS
The trial court in the Baby M case determined, in essence, that because
New Jersey's legislature had not specifically approved or rejected surrogate
parentage contracts, the judiciary was free to use its broad, inherent powers
to develop appropriate responses.7 The answer developed by the court was
to enforce a preconception agreement calling for a woman to relinquish a
biological child that she would conceive through artificial insemination and
carry to birth.8 Each contracting party involved in the conception already
was married to another person, and the biological mother was to receive a
fee for her role.9 After the child's birth the biological mother changed her
mind. Following a series of events widely reported in the news to a fasci-
nated public, the parties ended up in court to resolve issues of parental status
and custody. The trial judge held that even though the biological mother
was not "unfit," termination of her parental rights was accomplished
through her contractual commitment and, therefore, only the biological fa-
6. A recent study by the Office of Technology Assessment estimates that about 11,000
physicians provide artificial insemination services and that some 65,000 babies are born each
year after conception through the process, with about half of those involving heterologous and
the other half homologous artificial insemination. See OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION: Practice in the United States: Summary of a 1987 Survey-Back-
ground Paper, OT-BP-BA-48 (USGPO, August 1988) [hereinafter OTA Summary].
7. 217 N.J. Super at 318-19, 525 A.2d at 1130-31.
8. Id. at 400, 525 A.2d at 1171.
9. The monetary and other terms can be found in the Surrogate Parenting Agreement,
which is reproduced as an Appendix. Id. at 470, 537 A.2d at 1265.
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ther's consent was necessary for adoption of the child by the latter's wife. 1
In an ostensibly expedited procedure' the New Jersey Supreme Court
took the case on appeal and heard oral arguments. Some four months later
the Court dismayed proponents of surrogate parenthood contracts by decid-
ing that the agreement was not legally enforceable and holding that the
rights and duties of the parties were governed by existing principles and
rules of family law. Under that rationale, the two biological or "natural"
parents of the child were the legal parents. Although the court found suffi-
cient information in the trial record to decide that primary custody of the
child with the biological/legal father should be continued,1 2 a hearing was
ordered for the purpose of determining the biological/legal mother's visita-
tion rights.' 3 The court then made an addition to existing rules and princi-
ples of family law by stating that in future cases if a surrogate mother should
refuse to relinquish her child contrary to contractual agreement, the child in
nearly all instances would remain with the biological mother while perma-
nent custody is being determined. 4
The Court's determination that family law rules and principles control is
what gives the appellate court's decision significant potential by almost inev-
itably forcing reexamination of those rules and principles beyond the context
of surrogate parent agreements. 5
10. Either consent by or termination of the rights of a living parent of a child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate, usually is necessary before the child can be adopted.
11. The typically slow process of the judiciary is well understood by lawyers and others
directly involved in the process of appellate litigation. Media announcement of an "expedited"
process, which meant that a hearing would be held in less than a year, may have served to
better introduce the public to just how long litigation can take even under the most favorable
schedule.
12. 109 N.J. at 452-63, 537 A.2d at 1255-61.
13. The court also specified that, in accordance with past practice, a different trial judge
would hear the further proceeding. Id. at 1261 n. 19. On remand, the judge provided for
regular visitation period of eight hours each week by the natural mother during 1988, to be
expanded to include overnight visits and two weeks each summer during 1989. See Surrogacy-
Baby M-Mother's Visitation Rights, 14 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1276 (April 10, 1988).
14. One concern was that the parent given custody pending the suit would likely have
custody continued, as it would be in the best interests of the child if the case should take up an
extended amount of time in the courts. Some would say that this is at least tacit recognition of
the importance of the concept of psychological parentage in making custody decisions.
The firmness of the court's conviction on this issue is reflected in its language:
Any application by the natural father in a surrogacy dispute for custody pending the
outcome of the litigation will henceforth require proof of unfitness, of danger to the
child, or the like, of so high a quality and persuasiveness as to make it unlikely that
such application will succeed.
109 N.J. at 462-63, 537 A.2d at 1261.
15. It should be recognized that this simple statement of the facts and holdings in the case
is offered only to explain its potential catalytic effect. However, the detail in which some of the
arguments not mentioned above were addressed inconclusively (e.g., grandparent rights, con-
[Vol. 5:1
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III. THE PROBLEMS IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Some of the most significant developments that lead to the current need
for reform can be placed in appropriate perspective by the simple, hypotheti-
cal case of a married couple trying to decide between heterologous artificial
insemination (AID) 16 and adoption. The following section will first specu-
late about what might have happened twenty-five years ago. Next the sec-
tion will analyze how subsequent changes not focused directly on assisted
conception have made responses far more complex and difficult.
It is unlikely that a physician consulted by our mythical couple in 1964
would have been asked (or would have volunteered) to compare the legal
issues that might stem from adoption and artificial insemination. At that
time, the modem doctrine of informed consent, a response to patients' insis-
tence on being given more information to exercise personal autonomy in de-
cision making, 7 was nascent at best."8 The physician's perceived role would
have been to diagnose, to give advice about such exclusively medical matters
as fertility, and to explain how artificial insemination works. It is easy to
understand the comparative attraction of an assisted conception process that
would lead to the wife's bearing a child that would be the biological offspring
of at least one of them. This would further be enhanced by the prospect that
the wife would become pregnant and give birth with only the couple and
their physician aware that the husband was not the biological father.
It can by no means be assumed that the couple would have sought legal
advice in 1964, but one can surmise what a knowledgeable lawyer might
have told them if called on to compare AID and adoption. Probably there
would have been an initial explanation that adoption was a statutorily cre-
ated institution through which a legal parent-child relationship could be cre-
ated between persons without such a biological tie, and that by touching the
prescribed legal bases the parties could assure that they would acquire pa-
stitutional rights regarding procreation) further highlight the many family law issues that can
abound in such cases.
16. For an explanation of the various assisted conception techniques such as AID and
their underlying scientific basis, see Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technolo-
gies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY 32S-33S (Supp. 1 1986); ANDREWS, MEDICAL GENETICS: A
LEGAL FRONTIER (1987); King, Reproductive Technologies, in 1 BIOLAW, Ch. 7 (1986).
17. The landmark case of Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972) was not
decided until 7 years later. However, the facts on which the Canterbury decision was based
had taken place in 1958. For more detailed consideration of the dynamics underlying the
doctrine of informed consent and the effect of treating it legally within the framework of negli-
gence, see J. KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT (1984), and Wadlington,
Breaking the Silence of Doctor and Patient, 93 YALE L.J. 1640 (1984).
18. Even if the doctrine had been established by then, it is doubtful that the physician
would have been considered to have a duty to convey legal rather than medical information.
1989]
Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy
rental rights as well as duties.19 As to a child born through AID, unless the
parties lived in Georgia2" the lawyer would have pointed out the lack of
statutory enactments dealing with artificial insemination, but the existence of
a strong legal presumption that a child conceived by, or born to, a married
woman during cohabitation with her husband was the latter's legitimate
child.2 It also would have been noted that because of the state of scientific
blood testing and our understanding of genetics, there was then little likeli-
hood that the paternity could or would be legally determined through scien-
tific means.22 Depending on their particular jurisdiction, the couple might
also have been told that neither of them would be permitted to give testi-
mony that would render the child illegitimate,23 and that the chances of
someone else (the sperm donor, for example) being accorded legal standing
to assert parenthood were slim to nonexistent.24
Feeling comfortable that heterologous artificial insemination would pres-
ent no major immediate or long term legal problems for them or a child born
to the wife through the process, it would not have been surprising for the
couple to select this assisted conception avenue to parenthood. Before in-
semination of the wife, a written consent form might have been executed by
the couple though its primary, if not sole, purpose probably would have been
to protect the inseminating physician from liability.2 It would have been
very likely for the medical record to be carefully maintained in a fashion that
would avoid later identification of the sperm donor, who might well have
been someone chosen by the doctor on what could hardly be described as a
random selection process.26
19. Actually, at that time in some states limited rights might have been retained by the
adoptee in the relinquishing parent's estate or the adopter might not have been automatically
integrated into the lineage of the adoptee for all legal purposes.
20. Georgia enacted the first state statute on human artificial insemination in 1964, the
year when your couple was seeking advice.
21. See, e.g., West Virginia ex rel. J.L.K. v. R.A.I, II, 294 S.E.2d 142 (W. Va. 1982). This
longstanding presumption served an important purpose in its day: fixing legal paternity when
biological paternity could not be determined, and thus avoiding possible illegitimacy. There
might have been other legal concerns for our hypothetical couple, including whether the proce-
dure might have been considered adultery.
For further discussion of the presumption, see H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-
TIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 191 (2d ed. 1988).
22. At that time blood tests were used almost exclusively to negate paternity rather than
to establish it affirmatively. For a general discussion of the evolution of legally acceptable tests
for proving or disproving paternity, see H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 185.
23. Once the presumption of legitimacy was rebutted by the testimony of others, some
courts permitted further testimony by the spouses. See, e.g., Staley v. Staley, 25 Md. App. 99,
335 A.2d 114 (1975).
24. See, e.g., A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d 1222 (Wyo. 1982).
25. See Wadlington, Artificial Insemination, supra note 5, at 783.
26. For discussion of past selection practices by physicians, see Curie-Cohen, Luttrell &
[Vol. 5:1
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IV. THE WORLD SINCE 1964
Since 1964,27 many things have occurred that might change the advice the
preceding couple or their counterparts should or would receive. This raises
questions both about the effect on those who chose assisted conception in
what seemed like a world of simpler legal rules, as well as the increasing
complexity and uncertainty of legal answers and projections for persons in
similar circumstances today. The following review of significant legal, scien-
tific and social developments that could have such effects is not intended to
be all-encompassing. Rather, it is designed to point out the most important
changes that alone or in combination complicate current choices about as-
sisted conception. More importantly, it should be useful for understanding
why the problems today transcend issues of surrogate parentage contracts
and provide forceful reason for broad reexamination of the legal relation of
parent (and would be parent), child and state. What may initially look like
disparate pieces will be fitted together to provide a broader picture of a scene
fraught with conflicting approaches and tensions.
A. Developments in the World of Medicine and Science
Increased scientific knowledge has lead to the development of new and
better means for fixing paternity. Procedures such as human leucocyte anti-
gens (HLA) testing now are widely accepted for use even in affirmatively
establishing paternity rather than simply excluding it as a possibility.2" Even
more refined capacity is considered to be just around the corner. Of at least
equal importance is our vastly increased understanding of genetics, which
has produced new specialties such as genetic screening and counseling. This
in turn has increased demand for assisted conception as a practical alterna-
tive for couples wishing to avoid conception or birth of children with serious
hereditary defects or conditions.
What is routinely described as the new reproductive technology enables
conception to take place outside the human body through techniques such as
in vitro fertilization (IVF).z9 Scientists now can transfer a fertilized egg from
Shapiro, Current Practice of Artificial Insemination by Donor in the United States, 300 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 585, 587 (1979). A more recent description can be found in OTA Summary,
supra note 6, at 1-8.
27. The year 1964 was selected not just for symmetry. As noted in supra, note 20, that
was the year in which Georgia became the first of our states to adopt a statute specifically
dealing with human artificial insemination.
28. See, e.g., N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 538 (1988).
29. For further technical discussion, see Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive
Technologies, supra note 16, at 39S et seq. For a review of some of the responses in 1978 to
what was considered the first IVF birth, see Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 5.
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one body to another through surrogate embryo transfer (SET),3" posing is-
sues previously alien to our law such as disputes over legal maternity.3 ' If
X's fertilized egg is carried to gestation in Y's womb, should the genetic
mother or the gestational mother be regarded as the legal mother or should
each person have a legally recognized interest? One could proliferate the
possible problems by cases where this is done under contract with another
woman, Z, raising the question of whether an expectational mother should
have a protected legal interest. Should issues of motivation be considered
(e.g., should "womb mothers" be available for the convenience of the genetic
mother)? Diagramming the various possibilities now calls for an expanded
vocabulary to distinguish between the various parties.
Other important technological developments include cryogenic storage ca-
pacity that now allows "banking" of embryos, as well as semen.32 Already
this has produced legal issues regarding matters such as posthumous use of
sperm33 or disposal of frozen embryos.34
The Acquired Immuno Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic and our
flailing attempts to contain it are having great influence on assisted concep-
tion practices (particularly heterologous artificial insemination) because in-
fection can be spread through semen, as well as gestation. Concern for
assuring that donors are neither seropositive nor at special risk for AIDS has
30. See Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, supra note 16, at
42S.
31. In a case decided as recently as 1982 dealing with paternity outside the context of
assisted conception, a court held that: "Nature identifies the mother at time of birth. There is
no need to engage in presumptions." A v. X, Y, and Z, 641 P.2d at 1225. Obviously this did
not take into consideration the potential of in vitro fertilization.
32. At this point a process for "banking" eggs safely for later use remains to be developed.
33. The possible effects of this on the Rule Against Perpetuities were discussed as long ago
as 1962 in an article by a prominent property teacher, who noted the potential legal concept of
a child en ventre safrigidaire. See Leach, Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank and
the Fertile Decedent, 48 A.B.A. J. 942 (1962). For a more recent commentary, see Note, Gene-
sis Retold: Legal Issues Raised by the Cryopreservation of Preimplantation Human Embryos, 36
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021 (1985).
34. In 1984, a special commission of the State of Victoria, Australia issued a Report on
the Disposition of Embryos Produced by In Vitro Fertilization. The State of Pennsylvania has
adopted legislation on reporting about IVF that includes information on the "[n]umber of
fertilized eggs destroyed or discarded." 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (Purdon 1983).
Louisiana has a more detailed statute which provides, among other things, that:
An in vitro fertilized human ovum is a biological human being which is not the
property of the physician which acts as an agent of fertilization, or the facility which
employs him or the donors of the sperm and ovum.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:126 (West Supp. 1989).
The Louisiana Act also provides that:
Any physician or medical facility who causes in vitro fertilization of a human ovum
in vitro will be directly responsible for the in vitro safekeeping of the fertilized ovum.
Id. at § 9:127.
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led to much greater record keeping about donors,35 in stark contrast to pre-
vious practices of calculated anonymity or secrecy.36
B. The World of Law
At the same time when new and more reliable scientific tests for fixing
biological parenthood were being developed, the strength of the longstanding
presumption of paternity and its insulation from legal challenges were erod-
ing. Rules limiting standing to assert paternity have been relaxed signifi-
cantly in some jurisdictions, 37 and today it is not unusual to permit
presumptive parents to testify even if this would render the child of a mar-
ried woman illegitimate.3 8
In situations generally regarded as unrelated to assisted conception, there
has been increasing recognition of parental, or quasi-parental, legal rights
and duties between persons not related through biological connection. Ex-
amples are seen in stepparent relationships39 and in cases involving tacit or
express acceptance of the concept of psychological parentage.' The latter
can arise in such contexts as custody, visitation, support, and termination of
parental rights. The concept that a child might appropriately retain some
legal and social connection with more than one "mother" or "father" also is
gaining recognition through nascent doctrine or institutions such as "open"
35. The OTA Summary indicates that in 1987 seventy-eight percent of the reporting AID
practitioners said that they tested for HIV. OTA Summary, supra note 6, at 1-9. All fifteen
sperm banks in the study reported that they administered such tests. Id. at 1-11.
A special problem that has led some fertility centers to conduct their own testing and bank-
ing is that an initial ELISA test may not be adequate and it is, therefore, advisable to freeze the
sperm and retest the donor some six months later. This obviously has the effect of requiring
even greater record keeping.
36. See Wadlington, Artificial Insemination, supra note 5, at 777; Curie-Cohen, Luttrell &
Shapiro, supra note 26, at 587.
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-843 (West Supp. 1988); Thornsberry v. Supe-
rior Court ex rel. Hunter, 146 Ariz. 517, 707 P.2d 315 (1985).
38. See, e.g., Cassady v. Martin, 200 Va. 1093, 266 S.E.2d 104 (Va. 1980).
39. See, e.g., Washington Statewide Organization of Stepparents v. Smith, 85 Wash.2d
564, 536 P.2d 1202 (1975); Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984).
40. See, e.g., Bennett v. Jeffreys, 40 N.Y.2d 543, 387 N.Y.S.2d 821, 356 N.E.2d 277
(1976). The concept of "psychological parentage" has received widespread attention since the
1973 publication of GOLDSTEIN, FREUD AND SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1973). One provision of a Model Child Placement statute in the book includes this
definition:
A psychological parent is one who, on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through inter-
action, companionship, interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological
needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs. The psychological parent
may be a biological, adoptive, foster, or common law parent, or any other person.
There is no presumption in favor of any of these after the initial assignment at birth.
[Cross reference numbers have been omitted.]
Id. at 98.
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adoption, in which some formal or informal ties are maintained between a
child and a relinquishing parent after legal adoption by other persons.4' It is
even being suggested that a similar approach be considered for at least some
cases involving biological connection through egg or sperm donation.
The "constitutionalization" of domestic relations - long a virtually unchal-
lengeable bastion of states' rights - has had important impact on blatantly
discriminatory laws of the past.42 As a result, more people have turned to
courts for relief from what they consider arbitrary regulation of family rela-
tionships or sexual practices. Examples are seen in the ongoing of cases
through which the Supreme Court of the United States has sharply curtailed
discrimination against children or their parents based on the illegitimate sta-
tus.43 Questions remain about whether some such cases are more protective
of the rights of children or of their parents, as exemplified in the turmoil in
adoption practice after it was held in Stanley v. Illinois" that biological fa-
thers of illegitimate children have a right to notice and a hearing about fit-
ness before their parental rights can be terminated.45
While it is a phenomenon not generally assessed in constitutional dimen-
sions, concerns about personal autonomy have vastly increased the use of
"private ordering" within the sphere of domestic relations. This phenome-
non is best exemplified by the broad expansion, through both legislative and
judicial action, of the legally permissible scope of private contracting be-
tween spouses before and after marriage to "make their own deals" with
regard to economic incidents on divorce, as well as death.46 There also has
been a widespread increase in the scope of contracting for nonmarital or
"alternative" living agreements. Other constitutional decisions have legally
41. See, e.g., Michaud v. Wawruck, 209 Conn. 407, 551 A.2d 738 (1988); cf Weinschel v.
Strople, 56 Md. App. 252, 466 A.2d 1301 (1983).
42. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (discrimination in marriage laws based
on race); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (discrimination in support based on sex).
43. Included, among many others, are Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968); Gomez v.
Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); and Lehr v. Robert-
son, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
44. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
45. For a discussion of the problems created by Stanley, see Note, The Strange Boundaries
of Stanley: Providing Notice to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REV. 517 (1973). The
continuing difficulty of providing appropriate responses to the Stanley decision in the context
of adoption illustrated by Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
46. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(a) (first promulgated in 1970) ex-
plains that parties to a marriage can enter written separation agreements "[t]o promote amica-
ble settlement of disputes . . . attendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their
marriage...." 9A U.L.A. 216 (1987). The UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT pro-
vides enormous latitude for the parties to contract before marriage with regard to the resolu-
tion of economic disputes on dissolution and also to establish rules that will govern them once
they marry each other. 9B U.L.A. 369 (1987).
[Vol. 5:1
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reinforced personal autonomy rights with regard to child bearing,47 further
delineating the right of privacy that formed the basis for decisions limiting
state restrictions on personal decision making about abortion.48
Another highly important legal change has been the near radical restruc-
turing of the divorce process. Divorce now is much easier to obtain than it
was in the past. In 1965 it was still widely possible for one party to thwart
the other from dissolving a marriage in the absence of proof of some legisla-
tively specified antisocial conduct.49 Today divorce is increasingly a matter
of negotiation rather than litigation, and usually the most that an objecting
party can accomplish is delay.
Although there has been increased legal recognition of personal autonomy
in decision making about such matters as the economic effects of marriage
and divorce,5° as well as nonmarital relationships,5" states have carefully
guarded their power to oversee the effects of parental and third party con-
duct and agreements with regard to children.52 Courts and legislatures have
displayed increased willingness to intervene in family decisions about issues
such as medical care.53 Some states, including New Jersey, also place sub-
47. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
48. The primary case enunciating the right in this context, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 959 (1973), has been since subjected to many questions and significant
gloss. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747 (1986) and cases cited therein.
49. Although some states had enacted statutes providing that divorce could be granted
without regard to fault when the husband and the wife had lived apart for a specified period,
these provisions often required several years of separation. Usually such a provision simply
was added to an existing list of fault based grounds which were retained. A more defined and
powerful movement toward eliminating some or all fault grounds and replacing them with
"break down" grounds began about 1970. For further discussion of this movement and its
background, see Wadlington, Divorce Without Fault Without Perjury, 52 VA. L.REv. 32
(1966).
50. UNIFORM PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(4) even permits a couple to con-
tract before marriage with respect to "the modification or elimination of spousal support." 9B
U.L.A. 373 (1987).
51. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal.3d 660, 134 Cal.Rptr. 815, 557 P.2d 106 (1976);
Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); and Morone v. Morone, 50
N.Y.2d 481, 429 N.Y.S.2d 592, 413 N.E.2d 1154 (1980). Not all states have recognized such
agreements, however. See, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 77 I11. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
52. This reservation of power is reflected in the two models for economic dealings men-
tion earlier. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 306(f) allows a court to expressly
preclude or limit modification of the parties' contract "[e]xcept for terms concerning the sup-
port, custody, or visitation of children". 9A U.L.A. 217 (1987). UNIFORM PREMARITAL
AGREEMENT ACT § 3(b) provides that "The right of a child to support may not be adversely
affected by a premarital agreement." 9B U.L.A. 373 (1987). For an illustration of judicial
unbundling of a separation agreement to determine which parts were for child support, and
therefore nonmodifiable, see Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 211 S.E.2d 253 (1975).
53. For illustrations of this see In re Sampson, 65 Misc.2d 658, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (1970),
aff'd per curiam, 29 N.Y.2d 900, 328 N.Y.S.2d 686, 278 N.E.2d 918 (1972).
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stantial limitations on procedures for adoptive placement or termination of
parental rights.54
A final development that should be considered is the addition of sharp
new teeth to state child support laws, in large measure as a result of federal
pressure directed toward lessening public support contributions."
C. Social and Demographic Change
Perhaps the greatest change since 1965 has been the increased popular
awareness and acceptance of new (and old) reproductive technology. This
has heightened popular expectations about its availability in timely fashion
for all those who wish to use it56 at a time of marked decline in the availabil-
ity of healthy neonates for adoption."
Along with concern about the threat of AIDS, increased popular interest
in knowing more about one's personal history is exerting pressure to change
the widespread past practice of anonymous record keeping with regard to
the identity of sperm donors. 58
54. The stringency of the New Jersey rules in this regard was explained by the court in In
re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 425-27, 537 A.2d at 1242.
55. The Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, 42 U.S.C.A. § 666, require
states to adopt a number of provisions with regard to enforcement in order to maintain federal
financial participation in public assistance programs. Examples include: simplified and faster
withholding from wages, deductions from tax refunds, and provisions establishing liens against
property. Under the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 (OBRA), a federal tax inter-
cept program was created. See Sorenson v. Secretary of the Treasury, 474 U.S. 851 (1986).
56. These expectations have had political impact in at least one state, Maryland, where
the legislature has required that medical contracts and health insurance policies offering preg-
nancy-related benefits may not exclude benefits for in vitro fertilization under certain defined
conditions. See MD. ANN. CODE art. 48A, §§ 354DD, 470W, 477EE (1986).
57. In 1965 there was a fairly elaborate system for facilitating relinquishment and adop-
tive placement of children (particularly illegitimate children) with various social and religious
groups offering facilities where expectant mothers could stay until birth and effect anonymous
relinquishment of their children for adoption. Changes in social and legal attitudes about birth
control, abortion, and illegitimacy, as well as modification of former stereotypes about single
parents and the effects of Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972), have served to substantially
lessen the functions or cause the demise of many of these. For further discussion, see
Wadlington, Artificial Conception, supra note 5, at 466.
58. One facet of this can be described as the search for personal or cultural "roots." An-
other is concern about knowing one's genetic makeup to avoid transmission of hereditary dis-
eases or anomalies. Cases arising thus far usually have come in the adoption context, but
many courts have been reluctant simply to open past records. See, e.g., In re Estate of Walker,
64 N.Y.2d 354, 486 N.Y.S.2d 899, 476 N.E.2d 298 (1985); In re Roger B., 84 Ill. 2d 323, 418
N.E.2d 751, app. dismissed, 454 U.S. 806 (1981). However, legislation in some states has pro-
vided for access by adoptees to what once were confidential documents regarding their parent-
age, at least after a certain age. See Pierce, Survey of State Laws and Legislation on Access to
Adoption Records-1983, 10 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3035 (March 6, 1984). One statute provides a
special procedure that might be used by an adopted person seeking to locate a pre-adoption
sibling. See Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.575 (1982).
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Popular acceptance of the new approach of easier access to divorce
through less traumatic procedures has been successful with regard to one
major objective of such simplification. While there is an elevated rate of
divorce, there is also a high rate of remarriage.59 It is arguable that persons
who go through the process of marital dissolution are not sufficiently alien-
ated from either marriage or the divorce process as to avoid remarriage.
Whatever the explanation for the high statistical incidence of remarriage, it
has had the important practical effect of creating confusion for many chil-
dren of these serial unions. This has also led to problems of determining the
rights and duties of stepparents and stepchildren. Both courts and legisla-
tures have been called upon to focus increasing attention on these issues in
recent years.6°
Popular concern for assuring protection of personal autonomy and mini-
mizing governmental intervention into personal decision making about is-
sues of domestic relations seems high. In view of the official reinforcement
of this through legal rules favoring private ordering of economic and other
incidents of marital and even nonmarital relationships, it should be no sur-
prise that surrogate parentage contracts are viewed by many persons as
merely a logical extension of such steps, if indeed an extension at all. Others,
however, are beginning to realize that recognition of unlimited surrogacy
contracting should not be considered so simplistically because it raises broad
issues concerning other highly important concerns such as sexual and eco-
nomic exploitation and child protection.
To catalogue all of the relevant changes during our 25 year base period
that might impact on the problems addressed here would be a monumental
task. This limited list is offered simply to round out the historical
perspective.
V. THE ISSUES TODAY
When one starts fitting the pieces together, the problems that today's
counterpart of our hypothetical couple might face 61 quickly become appar-
ent. The new pattern of record keeping for medical reasons such as AIDS
59. For statistics and discussion on this, see 38 THORNTON AND FREEDMAN, THE
CHANGING AMERICAN FAMILY, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU, INC., 10 (1983).
60. See, e.g., Miller v. Miller, 97 N.J. 154, 478 A.2d 351 (1984). While the cases and
statutes most often seem to focus on issues of support, some also have dealt with matters of
custody and visitation, or restrictions on intermarriage. See H. CLARK, supra note 21, at 84,
263, 710.
61. The most likely way that issues could be arise at this point would be for determination
of heirship. Our original couple could well be safe from contest with the passage of time,
though only barely in view of statutes of limitation that often do not begin to toll until after a
child reaches majority. See, e.g. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT § 7, 9B U.L.A. 306 (1987).
1989]
14 Journal of Contemporary Health Law and Policy [Vol. 5:1
prevention and concern about genetically transmissible disease, combined
with refined scientific testing methods, make the expectation that anonymity
can be maintained through presumptions of paternity and rules about stand-
ing unrealistic today, absent specific legal measures.62 As a result, we can
now be concerned that donors of egg or sperm might be able to assert
parenthood or have actions for support brought against them, given our
newer laws on the rights and duties of parents independent of their marital
status. This would seem to require statutory action if clarity is desired, and
in that process it would be necessary to confront conceptual issues such as
whether biological connection should continue to be the dominant factor in
fixing legal parentage in nearly all situations. In large measure, all of this
stems from our new-found ability to determine paternity through scientific
means whether we want to or not.
When one points to the solution of simply allowing private ordering for
surrogate parentage, the implications are great. If individuals can freely
contract for production of a child, why should the same approach not be
permitted for adoption?63 Should parents be able to terminate their parental
rights readily through contract?"
Because surrogacy contracts ordinarily intend to effect both child custody
and termination of parental rights of a biological parent, it is not surprising
that they would be regarded as significantly different from antenuptial con-
tracts or postmarital separation agreements which are designed to deal with
spousal property rights. The question of concern is whether one can "spot
zone" this single area or transaction to permit free private contracting with-
out doing so in others as well. What does the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision mean for law reformers seeking workable legislative responses?
While stating that present laws would not prohibit purely altruistic, non-
commercial surrogacy, the court pointed out that even in those cases a bio-
logical mother under present law should be given the opportunity to change
62. In the USCACA, discussed herein, a formal legislative attempt has been made to
permit maintenance of anonymity in the case of permitted surrogacy. However, this requires a
combination of judicial intervention and legislative authorization and it may not be foolproof.
See USCACA § 6(d), 9B U.L.A. 53 (Supp. 1989).
63. Adoption presently requires fairly elaborate intervention by the state, largely through
the judiciary, to determine the fitness for parentage of the potential adopter(s). Some disposi-
tion or relaxation from these rules usually is permitted in cases involving adoptions by blood
relatives or stepparents who have the consent of a natural parent.
64. This question is being raised for discussion increasingly in the context of seriously
defective children who have been maintained in neonatal intensive care units or through other
means against the preference of their parents. The child who then faces an expensive existence
with very low quality of life or functional capacity is the special subject of concern because the
child's support may fall almost entirely on the parents.
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her mind and assert parental rights.65 It added that "the Legislature is free
to deal with this most sensitive subject as it sees fit, subject only to constitu-
tional restraints." 66 The nature of such restraints is not spelled out because
the court's approach under existing law obviated the need for definition.
Legislatures, thus, will face unresolved issues concerning the constitutional
dimensions of a still nascent right of privacy with regard to procreation;
minimum constitutional standards applicable to criteria (not simply proce-
dural safeguards) for terminating parental rights; and the degree to which
judicial or other formal state involvement, in general, to protect the interests
of children, should be required.
Still other major policy considerations are likely to be raised in debate
about whether to "spot zone" to permit contracting for surrogacy. Consid-
erable debate followed the suggestion that allowing a "market" for un-
wanted children might have the desirable effect of inducing some pregnant
women to forego abortion and place their children for adoption after carry-
ing them to term.67 If one is seriously considering ways of dealing with the
increased demand for adoptable children, as well as social problems such as
abortion, there are approaches based on existing family law that should be
considered. One example is through the termination of the rights of inade-
quate parents 68 to make more children available for adoption at an earlier
age when they are regarded as most desirable for such placements. Thus far,
our focus has been process oriented, leading to the requirement that the case
for termination requires clear and convincing evidence. 69 Little has been
65. See In re Baby M, 109 N.J. at 466, 537 A.2d at 1264.
66. Id. at 466, 537 A.2d at 1264.
67. This idea was put forth in Landes and Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7
J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 343 (1978). It was revisited in a symposium published by the Boston
University Law Review the year before the appellate court's decision in Baby M. See Cohen,
Posnerism, Pluralism, Pessimism, 67 B.U.L. REV. 105 (1987). Professor Jane Maslow Cohen
places the family law issues of such a proposal in important perspective. Id. Though the
debate thus far has not centered on issues of surrogate parent agreements, it seems inevitable
that it will.
68. The term "inadequate" could be subject to various definitions. It is used here not with
the idea that it would permit broad "upgrading" of the homes of children to conform to some
middle-class set of cultural standards of values, but instead to recognize that in many instances
children remain in homes where they suffer physical and emotional harm because of inade-
quate means for dealing with often insoluble problems of substandard parental care and be-
cause there is no place for them to go without getting lost elsewhere in the system.
69. This is exemplified by Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). A dissent by Justice
Rehnquist, joined by three other Justices, foreshadowed the human problems and uncertainties
that remained, stating:
When in the context of a permanent neglect termination proceeding, the interests
of the child and the State in a stable, nurturing homelife are balance against the
interests of the parents in the rearing of their child, it cannot be said that either set of
interests is so clearly paramount as to require that risk of error be allocated to one
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done to clearly fix minimum standards of acceptable parental conduct on
which termination of rights can be based; the major attention has been de-
voted to establishing the requirement that the state conduct major efforts to
reunify the family. While the latter goal is unquestionably desirable when
there is some hope for its success, it is also good that increasing attention,
finally, is being devoted to avoidance of undue delay in instances when a
specific condition or incident (such as child abuse) triggered a breakdown in
the parental relationship that could not be remedied in a relatively short
period.7" Following through on this approach through better establishment
and enforcement of minimum standards could have the combined effect of
making more children available and providing homes for children in need of
them.71
An immediate illustration of areas that the Baby M decision might well
trigger for reexamination are visitation and custody. The increased recogni-
tion of parental rights regardless of marital status, along with widespread
serial marriage, have raised questions about whether past rules and practices
are realistic today in the best interests of children. The specific focus on
these problems in the appellate opinion in Baby M may well lead to further
recognition that they are ripe for reconsideration.
VI. RECENT LEGAL RESPONSES
Even if one accepts the premise that the New Jersey Supreme Court's
holding in Baby M could provide the needed catalyst for reform in the legal
area of parent, child and state, it seems only reasonable to ask whether de-
velopments, thus far, indicate that this will be the case. Passage of a year
without cataclysmic change does not alone support an argument that noth-
ing is likely to materialize. The very complexity of the problems that need to
be faced militates against any view that there are "quick fixes" that can solve
everything.
Alhough it is still early, the limited developments, thus far, might be con-
strued as suggesting that the former pattern of widespread introduction of
often elaborate schemes dealing specifically with surrogate parenthood con-
side or the other. Accordingly, a State constitutionally may conclude that the risk of
error should be borne in roughly equal fashion by use of the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof.
Id. at 790-91 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
70. An example of this is seen in the Virginia statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-284
(1988).
71. A major concern of such an expanded approach is that an undue burden might fall on
poor families. This, of course, is a matter that would have to be addressed and explored care-
fully to guard against such undue discrimination.
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tracts7 2 may be changing. Several state legislatures have acted to formally
repudiate such contracts, although some such statutes seem flawed in lan-
guage or approach.13 In one instance, a prohibiting statute has been limited
by a combination of executive and judicial action.74 Legislation that would
affirmatively endorse surrogacy has not met with success during this pe-
riod." The most significant development has been promulgation of the UNI-
FORM STATUS OF CHILDREN OF ASSISTED CONCEPTION ACT ("USCACA")
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.7 6
The Commissioners' UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, considered an avant garde
72. One such example is the Draft ABA Model Surrogacy Act, 22 FAM. L.Q. 123 (1988).
For other discussion and carefully drafted models, see Note, Developing a Concept of the Mod-
ern "Family": A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GEO. L.J. 1283 (1985); Onta-
rio Law Reform Commission Report on Human Artificial Reproduction and Related Matters
(1985); and Bezanson, Kurtz & Hovenkamp, Model Human Reproductive Technologies and
Surrogacy Act, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 943 (1987) (a model developed in a law school seminar).
For a review of various state legislative proposals prior to the Baby M decision, see Pierce,
Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, 11 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 3001 (Jan.
29, 1985).
73. Louisiana, for example has adopted a statute providing that surrogate motherhood
contracts "shall be absolutely null and shall be void and unenforceable as contrary to public
policy." LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2713(A) (West Supp. 1989). Such a contract is defined as "any
agreement whereby a person not married to the contributor of the sperm agrees for valuable
consideration to be inseminated, to carry any resulting fetus to birth, and then to relinquish to
the contributor of the sperm the custody and all rights and obligations to the child". Id. at
§ 9:2713(B). One can immediately raise the question whether the language of such a statute
includes only artificial insemination and not SET or IVF.
74. In Michigan, 1988 Mich. Pub. Acts 199 not only pronounced surrogate contracts void
and unenforceable but also provide a criminal sanction of up to 5 years of imprisonment for
certain parties who might be involved as arrangers of or parties to such a contract. A trial
court subsequently upheld the constitutionality of the act, but only after the Attorney General
of the State had agreed only to enforce its provisions if the contract required the mother to give
up the baby. See 2 BIOLAW U:1149 (1988).
75. It should be noted that one artificial insemination statute predating the Baby M case
made specific reference to the possible recognition of surrogacy by an unmarried mother. See
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-7212 (Michie 1985):
(B) A child born by means of artificial insemination to a woman who is unmarried
at the time of birth of the child shall be for all legal purpose the child of the woman
giving birth, except in the case of a surrogate mother, in which even the child shall be
that of the woman intended to be the mother. For birth registration purposes, in
cases of surrogate mothers, the woman giving birth shall be presumed to be the natu-
ral mother and shall be listed as such on the certificate of birth, but a substituted
certificate of birth may be issued upon orders of a court of competent jurisdiction.
76. See USCACA, 9B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989). Work on drafting this Act began before
the Baby M case had passed fully through the New Jersey court system, and the charge of the
drafters was to deal with status matters of assisted conception generally, not just with surro-
gacy.
In the interest of full disclosure, the author points out that he was a Reporter for this project
during its initial year of work, after which he resigned because of other personal commitments.
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model by many when it was promulgated in 1973,77 contained one section
dealing with children born through artificial insemination but noted in the
Commentary that, it "does not deal with many complex and serious legal
problems raised by the practice of artificial insemination. In an introduc
tory Prefatory Note to the 1988 Act, the Commissioners recognize that they
still have not provided "the complete answer to the overwhelming social
problem" of surrogate motherhood contracting.7 9 However, they have obvi-
ously proceeded far beyond the product of fifteen years earlier.
In their Commentary, the drafters of the USCACA profess neutrality on
whether surrogacy agreements should be recognized. Accordingly, the Act
offers a choice between provisions invalidating such contracts ° and recog-
nizing them for married couples under limited circumstances and in con-
formity with a strict procedure requiring judicial approval before
conception.8' Under the latter, a surrogate who has provided an egg for
assisted conception could withdraw her consent within a period of six
months from the last insemination and have the judicial order vacated with-
out liability.8 2 If the court vacates the order at the surrogate's request, the
surrogate will be deemed the mother of the resulting child and her husband,
if he was a party to the agreement, will be deemed the father.8 3
At this point it seems appropriate to question whether the USCACA is
77. This was the same year in which the Supreme Court of the United States decided that
a state could not grant legitimate children a right to support from their fathers without also
extending such a right to illegitimate children. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973). In doing
so, the court breathed new life into their earlier decision in Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968) which had come into question about whether it was simply an aberrational approach
dealing with a narrow fact situation.
78. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 302 (1987).
79. USCACA, 9B U.L.A. 50 (Supp. 1989).
80. Optional § 6 provides that such agreements are void. USCACA, 9B U.L.A. 52 (Supp.
1989).
81. These limitations are contained in USCACA §§ 6-9. USCACA, 9B U.L.A. at 52-54.
The "intended parents," under the definition in § 1 of the Act, must be a married couple "who
enter into an agreement under this [Act] providing that they will be parents of a child born to a
surrogate through assisted conception using egg and sperm of one or both [of them]. Id., 9B
U.L.A. at 50. The surrogate must be an adult, according to § 1(4), and the court must find
that "the intended mother is unable to bear a child or is unable to do so without unreasonable
risk to an unborn child or to the physical or mental health of the intended mother or child, and
the finding is supported by medical evidence .... Id. at §§ 1(4), 6(b)(2), 9B U.L.A. at 50, 52.
Other provisions call for counseling, genetic screening, and other findings including one that
"the intended parents, the surrogate, and the surrogate's husband, if any, meet the standards of
fitness applicable to adoptive parents in this State ...." Id. at § 6(b)(4), 9B U.L.A. at 52.
82. Id. at § 7(b), 9B U.L.A. at 53. According to subsection 7(a), the surrogate, her hus-
band, the intended parents of the court for cause, could terminate the agreement subsequent to
an order of approval of surrogacy but before commencement of pregnancy by assisted concep-
tion. Id., 9B U.L.A. at 53.
83. Id. at § 8(a), Alternative A, 9B U.L.A. at 54. If the surrogate is not married or her
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any different from the previously described surrogacy-specific models.
Clearly it is different, but it also must be recognized that the Act was
designed to be "assisted conception specific" and to complement existing
state laws and the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT. Except to the limited extent
that it would provide for enforceability of surrogacy agreements, it attempts
to deal with matters of status in cases involving assisted conception gener-
ally. In doing so, it breaks new ground in ways that will not be approved by
all, but nevertheless will have the effect of providing clarity where this is
needed. For example, § 2 of the Act fixes maternity on the basis of "who
gives birth to a child."84 This responds to the question of how one distin-
guishes between "birth mother" and "genetic mother." It also provides in
§ 4(b) that "[a]n individual who dies before implantation of an embryo, or
before a child is conceived other than through sexual intercourse, using the
individual's egg or sperm, is not a parent of the resulting child."8" It in-
cludes a section comparable to that of most adoption statutes that would fix
status under the Act as the basis for determining economic rights such as
property and inheritance.8 6 And, except to the extent specifically author-
ized, it excludes donors of sperm or egg from parental rights.87
In its pattern of falling back on existing state law, except in those cases
where clarity seems to be demanded because of special uncertainties created
by new assisted conception technology (and the limited optional provision
for surrogacy), the approach seems broadly consistent with the approach of
the appellate court in Baby M. It also seems significant that the model cho-
sen for optional surrogacy was patterned in considerable degree on modern
adoption, with its requirement of judicial approval and a showing of appro-
priate potential for parentage. Even so, it must be recognized that the Act
takes only a few steps toward the larger goal urged in this Comment. 88 The
analogous next step, in the context of the NCCUSL, would be a revision of
both the UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT and those portions of the UNIFORM
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT dealing with parent and child.8 9 In fact,
one cannot help but wonder whether the time finally has come for greater
husband was not a party to the agreement, paternity will be governed by existing state law (or
the Uniform Parentage Act where this has been adopted).
84. Id., 9B U.L.A. at 50.
85. Id., 9B U.L.A. at 51.
86. Id. at § 10, 9B U.L.A. at 55.
87. Id. at § 4(a), 9B U.L.A. at 51.
88. The drafters, of course, were not charged with such an expansive project.
89. Revision of other Acts such as the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, might be
affected by such revisions. Acts such as the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act
would be less in need of change because of their approach of using existing state support duties
while providing a common procedural enforcement mechanism to be used across state lines.
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uniformity in this area, and whether the needed reforms can be achieved
without it. For example, conflict of laws problems could abound if states
began adopting widely divergent definitions of paternity and maternity, as
well as approaches to private ordering for the possession, ownership and
control of children.
EPILOGUE
It is highly probable that journalists in the future will return occasionally
to the individual problems of Baby M and her respective families. The
poignant situation of the parties is likely to limit their attention to this par-
ticular human situation. But one can hope that all of the emotional expendi-
ture of the parties and the public observers could be translated into
something more broadly meaningful. If the decision of the Supreme Court
of New Jersey does provide a catalyst for that state and others to review and
reform existing domestic relations law dealing with parent and child, the
case will have had considerable value despite the difficulties it produced for
the parties involved. As the court pointed out at the close of their opinion,
providing a way for more persons "to enjoy the benefits of the new technol-
ogy ... while minimizing the risk of abuse"9 ° means that there must be some
societal consensus about values and objectives in this area. To accomplish
this effectively, the focus should be broader than surrogacy.
90. 109 N.J. at 469, 537 A.2d at 1264.
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